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T
I 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
  
he war in Syria is characterized by a complex web of interrelated armed 
conflicts involving internal and external State and non-State actors. The 
fighting is also distinguished by the widespread disregard for, or even ex-
plicit disavowal of, the law of armed conflict (LOAC) by many of the par-
ties. This article considers the legal implications of LOAC violations by a 
party to the conflict for the State or States providing it assistance or coop-
erating with that party. Specifically, it addresses the question: when do your 
partner’s LOAC problems become your LOAC problems? 
Although the war in Syria is commonly described as a “proxy war,” the 
term proxy does not adequately capture the range of relationships between 
the many State and non-State parties to the conflicts. The term “proxy” 
suggests a hierarchical- or agency-type relationship that overstates the de-
gree of influence that most external actors exert upon the Syrian recipients 
of their assistance. Although many external actors provide various forms of 
assistance to groups inside Syria, few non-State actors could be considered 
to be under the “effective control” of their benefactors.1  
For this reason, this article discusses “partners” rather than proxies. In 
speaking of partners, I am attempting to capture some of the legal issues 
that might arise from cooperation between the Syrian government, Iran, 
Russia, Hezbollah and various Shia militias on the one hand, and between 
the United States, other States belonging to the counter-ISIL coalition and 
local non-State Syrian forces (such as the Kurdish People’s Protection 
Units (YPG)) fighting ISIL on the other. Moreover, I wish to emphasize 
that in some respects the differences in the legal issues that arise from 
working with non-State actors rather than States may be differences of de-
gree, rather than differences in kind. This is especially true in the Syrian 
conflict where some of the most effective military actors—ISIL, Hezbollah 
and the YPG—are not States. The term “partner” is used to refer to both 
State and non-State recipients of assistance and “assisting State” to refer to 
a State providing any of various forms of assistance, including funding, 
training, arms, intelligence, logistical support, fire support and up to and 
including personnel conducting combined combat operations. 
                                                                                                                      
1. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judg-
ment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 115 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua]. 
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The article is divided into three parts. First, it sets out the core LOAC 
rules that are most relevant to the armed conflicts in Syria. Second, it exam-
ines some of the potential legal implications for an assisting State of LOAC 
violations committed by one its partners. Finally, the article lays out poten-
tial measures an assisting State can take to mitigate the risk that its partners 
will violate LOAC and that the assisting State will be legally implicated in 
any such violations.  
Although the legal issues focused on may be particularly prominent in 
Syria, they are by no means limited to this particular armed conflict. There 
are multiple other ongoing armed conflicts involving a mix of internal and 
external State and non-State actors where these legal issues are also at play.  
 
II. RELEVANT LOAC FRAMEWORK 
 
A. Selected LOAC Rules 
 
At the moment in Syria there are a number of interrelated non-
international armed conflicts (NIACs).2 These NIACs include, inter alia, 
conflicts between States and non-State actors such as the fighting between: 
(1) Syria and Russia on the one hand and Ahrar al-Sham, Jaish al-Islam and 
al Nusra Front on the other; and (2) the United States and its coalition 
partners on the one hand and ISIL on the other. There are also NIACs be-
tween non-State armed groups, such as the armed conflict between the 
YPG and ISIL.  
                                                                                                                      
2. Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 
3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]. A 
non-international armed conflict involves “protracted armed violence between govern-
mental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State.” 
Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT–94–1–I, Decision on Defense Motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995). See 
also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(f), July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 (“Paragraph 2(e) applies to armed conflicts not of an international character 
and thus does not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, 
isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature.”); Prosecutor v. 
Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, ¶ 87 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia 
Nov. 30, 2005) (“The Chamber is also conscious of Article 8 of the Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court (ICC) which, inter alia, defines, for its purposes, war crimes commit-
ted in an armed conflict not of an international character.”); Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case 
No. IT-04-84-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 49 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugo-
slavia Apr. 3, 2008) (listing factors that have bearing on the intensity of hostilities). 
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Thus, the relevant LOAC rules that will be the focus of this article are 
those applicable to NIACs, specifically the provisions of Common Article 
3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions governing the treatment of “persons 
taking no active part in hostilities”3 and the customary international law 
rules governing targeting.4 These rules are binding on all parties to a NIAC, 
whether they are States or non-State actors. In addition, certain serious 
LOAC violations, such as intentionally or recklessly5 attacking civilians or 
                                                                                                                      
3. See, e.g., Geneva Convention IV, supra note 2, art. 3. 
4. A core set of rules governing targeting are generally accepted to apply in NIACs. 
See generally Brian Egan, Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State, Address at the Annual 
Meeting of the American Society of International Law, Washington, DC: International 
Law, Legal Diplomacy, and the Counter-ISIL Campaign (Apr. 1, 2016), 92 INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW STUDIES 235 (2016), http://stockton.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi ?arti-
cle=1668&context=ils (identifying some of the targeting rules the United States regards as 
customary international law applicable to all parties in a NIAC); WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, 
THE LAW OF TARGETING 139 (2012); IAN HENDERSON, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF 
TARGETING: MILITARY OBJECTIVES, PROPORTIONALITY AND PRECAUTIONS IN ATTACK 
UNDER ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I 215 (2009); Michael N. Schmitt, Targeting in Operational 
Law, in THE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS 245 (Terry Gill & Diet-
er Fleck eds., 2010). 
5. See Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment, ¶ 54 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003) (describing the Trial Chamber’s reliance on the ICRC 
Commentary to Article 85 of Additional Protocol I distinguishing intent from recklessness). 
In its discussion of the mens rea of the crime at issue, the Galić Trial Chamber found that 
the perpetrator must undertake the attack “wilfully,” which it defined as wrongful intent, 
or recklessness, and explicitly not “mere negligence.” Id. The ICRC Commentary defines 
intent for the purposes of Article 51(2) and clearly distinguishes recklessness,“the attitude 
of an agent who, without being certain of a particular result, accepts the possibility of its 
happening,” from negligence, which the Commentary states describes a person who “acts 
without having his mind on the act or its consequences.” COMMENTARY ON THE ADDI-
TIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 
1949, ¶ 3474 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987). In 
its review of the Galić judgment, the Appeals Chamber held “[t]he Trial Chamber’s reason-
ing in this regard is correct and Galić offers no support for his contention that the Trial 
Chamber committed an error of law. Thus, to the extent that Galić impugns this specific 
finding, his argument is without merit and accordingly dismissed.” Prosecutor v. Galić, 
Case No. IT-98-29-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 140 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former 
Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2006). See also Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-A, Appeals 
Chamber Judgment, ¶ 270 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia July 17, 2008) 
(“The Appeals Chamber has previously ruled that the perpetrator of the crime of attack 
on civilians must undertake the attack ‘wilfully’ and that the latter incorporates “wrongful 
intent, or recklessness, [but] not ‘mere negligence.’ In other words, the mens rea require-
ment is met if it has been shown that the acts of violence which constitute this crime were 
willfully directed against civilians, that is, either deliberately against them or through reck-
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civilian objects, including specifically protected objects, constitute war 
crimes entailing individual responsibility.6 
 
B. Competence and LOAC Compliance  
 
In the context of assisting partners in a NIAC, the military competence of 
partner forces takes on a special significance. LOAC targeting rules pre-
suppose at least minimal competence by those operating weapons systems 
in armed conflict. 7 LOAC violations by parties to a conflict and war crimes 
                                                                                                                      
lessness. The Appeals Chamber considers that this definition encompasses both the no-
tions of ‘direct intent’ and ‘indirect intent’ mentioned by the Trial Chamber, and referred 
to by Strugar, as the mens rea element of an attack against civilians.”); Office of the Prose-
cutor, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Final Report to the 
Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign 
Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, ¶ 28, 39 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 
1257 (June 13, 2000), http://www.icty.org/x/file/Press/nato061300.pdf [hereinafter 
NATO Bombing Report] (“Attacks which are not directed against military objectives (par-
ticularly attacks directed against the civilian population) . . . may constitute the actus reus for 
the offence of unlawful attack [as a violation of the laws and customs of war]. The mens rea 
for the offence is intention or recklessness, not simple negligence.”); Prosecutor v. Novak 
Dukic, Case No. X-KR-07/394, First Instance Verdict, ¶ 189 (Court of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina,  June 12, 2009) (upheld on appeal),  http://www.worldcourts.com/wcsbih/eng/ 
decisions/2009.06.12_Prosecutor_v_Djukic.pdf (holding that under CIL applicable in 
both IACs and NIACs the “requisite mens rea for attacks against civilians is that the per-
petrator must conduct the attack ‘willfully’, which can also include recklessness, but can-
not be committed with mere negligence.”). But see U.S. Department of Defense, Manual 
for Military Commissions, United States, IV-4 (2010), http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/201 
0_Manual_for_Military_Commissions.pdf (Providing that the mens rea for the offense of 
attacking civilian objects is more akin to a negligence standard. “The accused intended 
such civilian property to be an object of the attack [and the] accused knew or should have 
known that such property was not a military objective.”); United States v. Ahmed al Darbi, 
Stipulation of Fact, at 19 (Military Comm’ns Dec. 20, 2013), https://lawfare.s3-us-west-
2.amazonaws.com/staging/s3fs-public/uploads/2014/02/Al-Darbi-II-PE001-Stipulat 
ion.pdf (defendant pled guilty to attacking civilians not directly participating in hostilities 
and attacking civilian property under the standard that he “knew or should have known of 
the factual circumstances that established their civilian status.”). 
6. Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2574 (2009) (cod-
ified at 10 U.S.C. § 950p) (2016) (listing the offenses of attacking civilians, civilian objects 
and protected property as crimes triable by military commission). 
7. See Geoffrey S. Corn, Regulating Hostilities in Non-International Armed Conflicts: Thoughts 
on Bridging the Divide between the Tadić Aspiration and Conflict Realities, 91 INTERNATIONAL 
LAW STUDIES 281, 315 (2015). 
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by individual fighters may arise not only from deliberate and intentional 
misconduct, but also due to incompetence. 
Violations of the LOAC rules resulting from incompetence that may 
entail responsibility for a State as a party to the conflict (as opposed to 
criminal responsibility for individual members of the partner force) include 
violating the prohibitions on making civilians and civilian objects as such 
the “object of attack.”8 For example, a partner may mistakenly make a civil-
ian the object of attack due to systematically flawed intelligence or poor 
coordination between its forces. Although such mistaken targeting would 
not necessarily implicate individual criminal responsibility, it could still 
constitute a violation of the underlying customary LOAC rule reflected in 
Article 51(2) of Additional Protocol I9 and therefore could incur State re-
sponsibility. 
Another relevant illustration is the prohibition on indiscriminate attacks 
and the requirement to take feasible precautions. The prohibition on indis-
criminate attacks applies both to the use of per se indiscriminate weapons10 
(such as German V-2 rockets in World War II), as well as the use of lawful 
weapons in an indiscriminate manner.11 Such indiscriminate attacks include 
those in which the weapon system could be aimed but the attacker fails to 
do so, attacks based on patently unreliable information and attacks in envi-
ronments that cause weapons to be highly inaccurate.12 If a partner con-
ducts attacks of this nature due to its inability to properly aim its weapons 
or obtain reliable intelligence, such attacks may be unlawful even if the at-
                                                                                                                      
8. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 51(2), June 8, 1977, 
1125 U.N.T.S. [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]. 
9. Compare Article 51(2) which provides that “[c]ivilian objects shall not be made the 
object of attack” with Article 85(3)(a) defining a grave breach as “willfully . . . making the 
civilian population or individual civilians the object of attack.” (emphasis added). 
10. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
Rep. 226, ¶ 78 (referring to the prohibition on indiscriminate weapons as a “cardinal” 
principal of LOAC). 
11. Additional Protocol I, supra note 8, art. 51(4)(a). 
12. Christopher J. Markham & Michael N. Schmitt, Precision Air Warfare and the Law of 
Armed Conflict, 89 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 669, 681 (2013) (“At its most basic level, 
an indiscriminate attack is one where the weapon system could be aimed, but the attacker 
fails to do so, as in the case of blindly dropping bombs over enemy territory. Other exam-
ples include an attack based on patently unreliable information and one in which the 
weapon is employed in an environment that causes it to be highly inaccurate (e.g., at a very 
high altitude or in weather that disrupts guidance system functionality).”). 
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tacker subjectively intends to attack military objectives.13 Because the 
standard is an objective one of reasonableness, the relevant inquiries in-
clude did the attacker take reasonable measures to verify the target and did 
the attacker consider all reasonably available information.14 Although a de-
termination of whether or not an attacker has taken feasible measures will 
not necessarily focus on specific incidents, an assessment of the reasona-
bleness of an attacker’s ultimate decision to attack should consider whether 
the precautionary measures it has employed have worked adequately in a 
high percentage of cases.15 
Not only may ineptitude result in violations of LOAC, but in some cir-
cumstances a mistaken targeting decision due to an attacker’s incompe-
tence may implicate individual criminal responsibility.16 The mens rea for 
targeting related war crimes includes not only deliberately directing attacks 
against civilians, civilian objects or other objects specifically protected un-
der LOAC, but also recklessly directing attacks against such persons and ob-
                                                                                                                      
13. See MICHAEL BOTHE, KARL JOSEF PARTSCH & WALDEMAR A. SOLF, NEW RULES 
FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 308 (1982) (Noting in connection with prohibitions 
on indiscriminate attacks in Article 51(4) and civilian objects in Article 52(1) of Additional 
Protocol I that the “use of unobserved fire against mobile targets depends for its military 
effectiveness, as well as legality, upon the accuracy and timeliness of target intelligence.” 
(emphasis added)).  
14. NATO Bombing Report, supra note 5, ¶ 29. See generally John J. Merriam, Affirma-
tive Target Identification: Operationalizing the Principle of Distinction for U.S. Warfighters, 56 VIR-
GINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 84 (2016). 
15. NATO Bombing Report, supra note 5, ¶ 29 (“Further, a determination that inade-
quate efforts have been made to distinguish between military objectives and civilians or 
civilian objects should not necessarily focus exclusively on a specific incident. If precau-
tionary measures have worked adequately in a very high percentage of cases then the fact 
that they have not worked in a small number of cases does not necessarily mean they are 
inadequate.”). 
16. Corn, Regulating Hostilities, supra note 7, at 319. See also NATO Bombing Report, 
supra note 5, ¶ 50 (Identifying reasonableness as the touchstone for evaluating the lawful-
ness of targeting and suggests “that the determination of relative values must be that of 
the ‘reasonable military commander.’ Although there will be room for argument in close 
cases, there will be many cases where reasonable military commanders will agree that the 
injury to noncombatants or the damage to civilian objects was clearly disproportionate to 
the military advantage gained.”); Geoffrey S. Corn, Targeting, Command Judgment, and a Pro-
posed Quantum of Information Component, 77 BROOKLYN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
437, 450–54 (2011) (discussing reasonableness as the “focal point of compliance with the 
military objective rule and, by implication, the principle of distinction”). 
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jects.17 As Geoffrey Corn has argued in the reference to the 2014 shoot-
down of flight MH17 in Ukraine, resolving the issue of whether or not the 
mistaken targeting of a civilian object constitutes a war crime would in-
volve a consideration of the reasonableness of the mistake. “[M]erely utiliz-
ing [a weapons] system without sufficient training and preparation could 
itself establish the unreasonableness of the employment judgment. This is 
because this type of mistake is a foreseeable consequence of fielding ad-
vanced combat capability without properly training forces to use that capa-
bility in compliance with IHL obligations.”18  
The following hypothetical illustrates how the foregoing legal consider-
ations might manifest themselves in the context of Syria. If a partner force 
(1) has systematic deficiencies in its targeting processes for air operations, 
(2) these flaws significantly increase the likelihood that the partner will mis-
identify civilians as combatants or civilian objects as military objectives, (3) 
the partner is aware of such deficiencies, but (4) nonetheless proceeds with 
targeting without remedying such deficiencies, such targeting may be char-
acterized as reckless and thus entail individual criminal responsibility for 
members of the partner force.19  
 
III. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR A PARTNER’S LOAC 
VIOLATIONS 
 
By virtue of the assistance provided by an assisting State to a partner 
(whether a State or non-State actor), LOAC violations by that partner (in-
cluding by members of a non-State actor) might have legal implications for 
the assisting State and/or its individual officials. This section examines 
some of these potential implications. 
Any assessment of when an assisting State is legally implicated by its 
partner’s LOAC violation would involve the following considerations: the 
degree of confidence that its partner has itself violated LOAC and whether 
                                                                                                                      
17. Strugar, supra note 5, ¶ 270 n.670 (defining recklessness as “the attitude of an agent 
who, without being certain of a particular result, accepts the possibility of it happening; on 
the other hand, ordinary negligence or lack of foresight is not covered, i.e., when a man 
acts without having his mind on the act or its consequences”). 
18. See Corn, Regulating Hostilities, supra note 7, at 315. 
19. The prohibition on the indiscriminate use of weapons and the criminal offense of 
recklessly directing attacks against civilians or civilian objects overlap. See, e.g., Michael N. 
Schmitt, Precision Attack and International Humanitarian Law, 87 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW 
OF THE RED CROSS 445, 446 (2005) (“In practice, though, the two prohibitions [on indis-
criminate attacks and direct attacks against civilians] often merge.”). 
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there is the requisite knowledge that its assistance will enable or facilitate 
the LOAC violation. Any determination will likely turn on the precise na-
ture of the assistance, awareness of how such assistance would be used and 
intent of the recipient with respect to the use of such assistance.  
If a partner violates LOAC, two general frameworks under which the 
assisting State or individual officials of the assisting State could be argued 
to bear international legal responsibility are: 1) as a matter of State respon-
sibility and 2) as an aider and abettor of the war crimes committed by the 
partner receiving the assistance. 
 
A. State Responsibility 
 
1. Control 
 
The most straightforward means in principle (and least relevant in practice) 
by which a State may bear responsibility in relation to the conduct of a 
non-State partner is if the non-State actor acts on the instruction of or un-
der the direction or control of the State. Article 8 of the Draft Articles on 
State Responsibility (Draft Articles) provides: “The conduct of a person or 
group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international 
law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instruction of, 
or under the control of, that State in carrying out the conduct.”20 Absent 
instruction or direction from the State to the non-State partner, the rele-
vant question is whether the State exercised the requisite level of control 
over the conduct of the partner.  
The standard articulated by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is 
one of effective control. “For the conduct to give rise to legal responsibility 
of the [State], it would in principal have to be proved that the state had effec-
tive control of the military or paramilitary operations in the course of which 
the alleged violations were committed.”21 A State has effective control 
                                                                                                                      
20. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts art. 8, 
Report of the International Law Commission, 53d Sess., Apr. 23–June 1, July 2–Aug. 10, 
2001, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, GAOR 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 
YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 32, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A 
/2001/Add.1 (Part 2) [hereinafter ARSIWA]; Nicaragua, supra note 1, ¶ 115; Application of 
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & 
Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. Rep. 43, ¶ 413 (Feb. 26) [hereinafter Geno-
cide case]. 
21. Nicaragua, supra note 1, ¶ 115 (emphasis added).  
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when it exercises control over a specific operation and the relevant conduct 
by the non-State actor took place in the course of that operation.22 
In contrast to the ICJ’s effective control standard, an appeals chamber 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has indi-
cated that “overall control” is the requisite degree of control for a non-
State actor to be considered as forces of the assisting State.
23
 A State would 
have overall control when, in addition to providing general support, it also 
has a role in organizing, coordinating or planning the military actions of a 
non-State armed group. This standard, which would be met by a lesser de-
gree of involvement by the State in particular operations than is required by 
the effective control test, has been less widely accepted than the tests artic-
ulated by the ICJ for the purpose of State responsibility. 
The standard of effective control appears to be rarely met in practice. 
In both the Nicaragua and Bosnian Genocide cases, the ICJ held that the 
standard was not met despite the substantial support (including training, 
arming, equipping and financing) provided by States to the non-State ac-
tors.24 Even under the overall control standard, without more, the mere 
provision of financial assistance or military equipment or training to a non-
State armed group is unlikely to result in State responsibility for the con-
duct of the non-State armed group. Thus, with respect to many of the 
partner relationships in the Syrian conflict and partnered operations more 
generally, neither the effective nor overall control standards appear likely to 
be directly implicated.  
 
2. Aid and Assistance 
 
With respect to State responsibility, the more relevant standard is likely to 
be responsibility that may arise by virtue of aid that an assisting State pro-
vides to a State partner, rather than responsibility for the actions of non-
State actors under the assisting State’s control.  
Article 16 of the Draft Articles addresses the standard for State respon-
sibility arising as a result of aid or assistance provided to another State. Un-
der Article 16, an assisting State would be responsible for a violation of 
international law if it aids or assists a partner in the commission of a viola-
                                                                                                                      
22. Id. 
23. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 131, 
137, 145 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999). 
24. Nicaragua, supra note 1, ¶ 115; Genocide case, supra note 20, ¶ 413. See also ARSIWA, 
supra note 20, art. 8. 
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tion of LOAC, if it does so with knowledge of the circumstances of its 
partner’s LOAC violation and if the LOAC violation would be internation-
ally wrongful when committed by the assisting State. 
The International Law Commission’s (ILC) Commentary to the Draft 
Articles explains that the “aid or assistance must be given with a view to 
facilitating the commission” of the unlawful act and that “[a] State is not 
responsible for aid or assistance under Article 16 unless the relevant State 
organ intended, by the aid or assistance given, to facilitate the occurrence 
of the wrongful conduct.”25 On its face, the ILC Commentary’s formulation 
of “with a view to facilitating” suggests actual intent on the part of the as-
sisting State. However, it remains unclear whether some lower form of mens 
rea, such as recklessness, would in some circumstances suffice. The ICJ did 
not reach the issue of the requisite intent in the Genocide case, as the Court 
held that Bosnia had not established the threshold requirement of 
knowledge on the part of Serbia.26 
In light of the uncertainty regarding the precise mens rea required to 
trigger State responsibility on the basis of aid or assistance to another State, 
there may be risks associated with the provision of assistance to a State 
partner even if the assisting State did not desire the commission of any 
wrongful act. For example, if an assisting State continued to provide assis-
tance to its partner with knowledge of systemic deficiencies in its partner’s 
targeting or detention practices that render LOAC violations more likely, 
there is a risk that the intent by the assisting State to facilitate LOAC viola-
tions could be inferred.  
 
3. Duty to Ensure Respect for LOAC  
 
Whether or not the assisting State could be viewed as responsible for any 
LOAC violations by a military partner, it could be argued that the assisting 
State has an independent obligation to take positive measures to prevent 
LOAC violations by its partners. The International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) has recently argued that Common Article 1 of the Geneva 
Conventions “has an external dimension related to ensuring respect for the 
Conventions by others that are Party to a conflict. Accordingly, States, 
                                                                                                                      
25. ARSIWA, supra note 20, at 66. Of note, the assisting State would not be responsi-
ble for any underlying wrongful act by its partner; rather, on this theory, the assisting State 
would be responsible for the separate act of providing aid or assistance. 
26. Genocide case, supra note 20, ¶¶ 421–22. 
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whether neutral, allied or enemy, must do everything reasonably in their 
power to ensure respect for the Conventions by others that are Party to a 
conflict.”27 Further the ICRC claims that the duty to ensure respect is not 
limited to the Geneva Conventions but extends to the entire body of 
LOAC binding upon a particular State.28 According to the ICRC, a third 
State has an international legal obligation to ensure respect for LOAC in all 
circumstances, in both international and non-international armed con-
flicts.29 In its view, the obligation is one of due diligence requiring States to 
make every lawful effort in their power to ensure compliance with LOAC 
and that the greater the means available to a State, the greater the responsi-
bility.30 Under this interpretation of Common Article 1,  
 
[t]he duty to ensure respect for the Geneva Conventions is particularly 
strong in the case of a partner in a joint operation . . . . The fact, for ex-
ample, that a High Contracting Party participates in the financing, equip-
ping, arming or training of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict, or 
even plans, carries out and debriefs operations jointly with such forces, 
places it in a unique position to influence the behaviour of those forces, 
and thus to ensure respect for the Conventions.31  
 
Thus, assisting States have a heightened responsibility to promote LOAC 
compliance by their partners, including stopping or preventing further 
LOAC violations, particularly if their partner is party to an ongoing armed 
conflict.  
The ICRC’s interpretation of the obligation to ensure respect, however, 
is not shared by the United States.32 More generally, it is unclear to what 
                                                                                                                      
27. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY TO GENEVA 
CONVENTION I FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND 
SICK IN THE ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD ¶ 153 (2d ed. 2016), https://ihl-database 
s.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=722395
88AFA66200C1257F7D00367DBD.  
28. Id., ¶ 126 
29. Id., ¶ 125 
30. Id. 
31. Id., ¶ 167. 
32. See Egan, supra note 4, at 245 (“Some have argued that the obligation in Common 
Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions to ‘ensure respect’ for the Conventions legally re-
quires us to undertake such steps and more vis-à-vis not only our partners, but all States 
and non-State actors engaged in armed conflict. Although we do not share this expansive 
interpretation of Common Article 1, as a matter of policy, we always seek to promote ad-
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extent this expansive understanding of ensure respect is shared by other 
States as the ICRC’s recent Commentary does not appear to take into ac-
count the views and practice of individual States. This omission is notable 
as the subsequent practice in the application of the Convention which es-
tablishes agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation would be par-
ticularly relevant in understanding Common Article 1.33  
Nonetheless, applying the ICRC’s interpretation in the context of the 
Syrian conflict, if an assisting State were aware of the systematic abuse of 
law of war detainees by a partner, such as al Nusra Front, the assisting State 
would be required to use both the carrots and sticks at its disposal in order 
to remedy the situation.34 The failure to take every lawful effort in their 
power to bring about compliance with at least the minimal standards for 
detainee treatment in Common Article 3 would constitute a violation of the 
duty to ensure respect. 
  
4. Arms Transfer Restrictions under the Arms Trade Treaty  
 
There could also be an argument that transfer of certain conventional arms 
by an assisting State to a partner would be inconsistent with the provisions 
of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), if the assisting State knew the arms 
would be used to commit violations of LOAC.35 Of particular relevance to 
the issue of arms transfers in the Syrian context is Article 6(3) which pro-
hibits, inter alia, the authorization of the transfer of certain categories of 
conventional arms, ammunition and munitions if the party “has knowledge 
at the time of the authorization that the arms or items would be used in the 
commission of . . . attacks directed against civilian objects or civilians pro-
tected as such.” The text of Article 6 makes clear that the State party, spe-
cifically the official responsible for authorizing the proposed export, must 
have direct or clear knowledge at the time of the authorization that the in-
tended recipient will use the arms or items in the commission of one or 
more of the specified crimes in order for the prohibition to apply.  
                                                                                                                      
herence to the law of armed conflict generally and encourage other States to do the 
same.”).  
33. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3)(b), May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331. 
34. See Risk Mitigation supra Section IV.  
35. Arms Trade Treaty, Apr. 2, 2013, 52 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 988 
(entered into force Dec. 24, 2014). 
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In addition under Article 7, parties to the ATT are required to “assess 
the potential that the conventional arms or items . . . could be used to 
commit or facilitate a serious violation of international humanitarian law” 
and, if so, to “consider whether there are measures that could be undertak-
en to mitigate risks.” If, after conducting the assessment and considering 
available mitigating measures, the exporting State determines there is an 
“overriding risk” that exported material could be used to further the com-
mission of a serious violation of international humanitarian law, Article 7 
obligates the exporting State “not [to] authorize the export.”  
There could be a non-frivolous argument that parties to the ATT act in 
violation of the treaty, in particular with respects to Article 6 and Article 7, 
if facts supported an inference that they transferred covered items to a 
partner with knowledge the items would be used to target civilians or civil-
ian objects. Such facts would include any pattern of apparent LOAC viola-
tions by a recipient partner or deficiencies in their military operations that 
would render LOAC violations inevitable. 
 
B. Individual Criminal Responsibility 
 
If individual members of a partner force (State or non-State) receiving as-
sistance commit war crimes, there could also be arguments that officials of 
the assisting State would be liable under international law for aiding and 
abetting such offenses even absent control over the partner forces that 
might entail State responsibility for the assisting State. There remains some 
debate regarding the standard for aiding and abetting in customary interna-
tional law, particularly with respect to the relevant mens rea of the accom-
plice.36 Nonetheless, the overwhelming majority of cases from international 
criminal tribunals indicate that under international criminal law the mens rea 
for aiding and abetting is some form of knowledge as opposed to a pur-
pose standard.37 
                                                                                                                      
36. See, e.g., David P. Stewart, Can the ICTY Šainović and Perišić Cases Be Reconciled? 108 
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 475 (2014); Janine Natalya Clark, “Specific 
Direction” and the Fragmentation of International Jurisprudence on Aiding and Abetting: Perišić and 
Beyond, 15 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW 411 (2015); Marko Milanovic, ICTY 
Appeals Chamber Reverses Šainović and Simatović Acquittal, Orders Retrial, Kills Off Specific Di-
rection (Again) EJIL TALK! (Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.ejiltalk.org/icty-appeals-chamber-
reverses-stanisic-and-simatovic-acquittal-orders-retrial-kills-off-specific-direction-again/ 
#more-13914. 
37. Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two Others (The Zyklon B Case), 1 LAW REPORTS OF 
THE TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 93 (1947) (Brit. Mil. Ct. 1946) (Two top officials of the 
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A potentially significant and relevant contribution to State practice and 
opinio juris on the question of the mens rea for aiding and abetting under cus-
tomary international law comes from the U.S. Military Commissions at 
Guantanamo Bay. In an October 2013 filing, the Chief Prosecutor en-
dorsed the standard for aiding and abetting liability adopted by the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone in Prosecutor v. Taylor.38 The prosecutor took the po-
                                                                                                                      
company manufacturing and selling Zyklon B were convicted of aiding and abetting on a 
knowledge standard and not the shared intent of the Nazi perpetrators.); United States v. 
Otto Ohlendorf et al. (The Einsatzgruppen Case), 4 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE 
THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 569 
(1951) (Convicting an interpreter for aiding and abetting murder on a knowledge standard. 
“Klingelhoefer has stated that his function in the Einsatzgruppe operation was only that 
of an interpreter. Even if this were true it would not exonerate him from guilt because in 
locating, evaluating, and turning over lists of Communist party functionaries to the execu-
tive department of his organization he was aware that the people listed would be executed 
when found. In this function, therefore, he served as an accessory to the crime.”); United 
States v. Krauch (The I.G. Farben Case), 8 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NU-
REMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 1169 (1952) 
(acquitting corporate executives who did not have “any significant knowledge” of the uses 
to which Zyklon B was being put.); Prosecutor v. Mrkšić et al., Case No. IT-95-13/1-A, 
Appeals Chamber Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia May 5, 2009); 
Prosecutor v. Šainović et al., Case No. IT-05-87-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Jan. 23, 2014); Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. 
SCSL-03-01-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment (Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.rscsl.org/Docu 
ments/Decisions/Taylor/Appeal/1389/SCSL-03-01-A-1389.pdf; Prosecutor v. Popovic 
et al., Case No. IT-05-88-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former 
Yugoslavia Jan. 30, 2015); Prosecutor v. Stanišić and Simatović, Case No. IT-03-69-A, 
Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 106 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Dec. 9, 
2015) (holding that for aiding and abetting liability to attach, an accessory must provide, 
inter alia, practical assistance that has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime 
and have knowledge that his acts assist the commission of the offense, but that it is not 
necessary to that the that the assistance was “specifically directed” to assist the commis-
sion of the underlying crime). See also Prosecutor v. Jose Cardoso, Case No. 04/2001, 
Judgment, ¶ 457 (Dili Dist. Ct. 2003) (“[I]t must be demonstrated that the aider and abet-
tor knew (in the sense that he was aware) that his own acts assisted in the commission of 
the specific crime in question by the principal offender. The aider and abettor must be 
aware of the essential elements of the crime committed by the principal offender, includ-
ing the principal offender’s state of mind. However, the aider and abettor need not share 
the intent of the principal offender.”). But see Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-A, 
Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 26–28 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Dec. 9, 
2014) (holding that an aider and abettor must “specifically direct” assistance to the com-
mission of the underlying crime).  
38. Government Motion to Make Minor Conforming Charges to the Charge Sheet 
(AE120B) at 2, United States v. Khalid Shaikh Mohammad et al. (Military Comm’ns Oct. 
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sition in United States v. Khalid Shaikh Mohammad, et al., that under customary 
international law, an accused is guilty of aiding and abetting when he/she  
 
1) [P]rovided practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support to 
the perpetration of a crime or underlying offense, and  
 
2) Such practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support, had a 
substantial effect upon the commission of a crime or underlying of-
fense.39 
 
Under this standard for aiding and abetting it is not necessary that the as-
sistance constituted a “but for” cause of the crime, nor (in contrast to State 
responsibility and federal law) that the assistance was specifically directed 
towards a crime.40 Assistance having a substantial effect could take a variety 
of forms, including transportation, providing personnel,41 weapons, ammu-
nition or fuel.42   
The Chief Prosecutor has further taken the position that the mens rea 
for aiding and abetting requires that: 
 
The Accused performed an act with the knowledge that such act would 
assist the commission of a crime or underlying offense, or that he was 
aware of the substantial likelihood that his acts would assist the commis-
sion of an underlying offense, and 
 
The Accused is aware of the essential elements of the crime committed 
by the principal offender, including the state of mind of the principal of-
fender.43 
 
At a minimum, an aider and abettor must be aware of a “substantial likeli-
hood” that he/she would assist in the commission of the offense, a stand-
                                                                                                                      
18, 2013), http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/KSM2/KSM%20II%20(AE120B(Gov%2 
0Sup)).pdf (“The Appellate Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone in Taylor dis-
cusses in great detail aiding and abetting liability, a form of vicarious liability, by assessing 
historical international humanitarian law cases and customary international law. As such, 
the Taylor decision is ‘newly decided case law,’ reflecting customary international law on 
aiding and abetting liability.” (citing Taylor, supra note 37)). 
39. Id. at 3 (citing Taylor). 
40. Id. at 3 (citing Taylor). 
41. Id. at 3 (citing Taylor). 
42. Taylor, supra note 37, ¶ 369. 
43. Government Motion, supra note 38, at 4.  
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ard akin to recklessness.44 A conscious desire or willingness to achieve the 
criminal results is not required.45 However, the mens rea requires more than 
a “general or abstract awareness that any type of crime could be commit-
ted” during an armed conflict as “law of war violations are nearly inevitable 
in any armed conflict.”46  
Applying this standard to a hypothetical example drawn from the Syri-
an conflict, it is widely reported that the Syrian government conducts air-
strikes that violate LOAC, either because they deliberately target civilians 
or civilian objects or because the airstrikes are indiscriminate.47 If officials 
of an assisting State provided intelligence, fuel, maintenance or munitions 
that had a “substantial effect” on enabling a Syrian airstrike that constituted 
a war crime, such assistance would satisfy the actus reus for aiding and abet-
ting under the standard endorsed by the Military Commissions Chief Pros-
ecutor in U.S. v. Khalid Shaikh Mohammad et al.  
With respect to the mens rea, it would be sufficient under this standard 
to show that officials of the assisting State were aware at the time of 
providing assistance to the Syrian military: (1) of the substantial likelihood that 
their military aid would assist the unlawful airstrikes and (2) that Syrian per-
sonnel intended to deliberately or recklessly attack civilian objects, civilians 
or specifically protected objects such as hospitals. Notably, it would not be 
necessary to show that officials of the assisting State desired the commis-
sion of the underlying crime. Nor would it be necessary to show that offi-
cials of the assisting State even had actual knowledge that their military aid 
would assist the perpetration of a specific crime by their partner.48 
                                                                                                                      
44. Taylor, supra note 37, at 190 n.1289. It should be noted that the precise definition 
of recklessness and its civil law analogue dolus eventualis may vary according to jurisdiction.  
45. Government Motion, supra note 38, at 4 (citing Taylor). 
46. Id. at 4 (citing Taylor). 
47. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DEATH FROM THE SKIES, DELIBERATE AND 
INDISCRIMINATE AIR STRIKES ON CIVILIANS (Apr. 10, 2013), https://www.hrw.org/repor 
t/2013/04/10/death-skies/deliberate-and-indiscriminate-air-strikes-civilians.  
48. See Josh Rogin, Russia Risks Being Prosecuted for Syria’s War Crimes, BLOOM-
BERGVIEW (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/sns-wp-blm-declassi 
fied-russia-43dc7028-67b2-11e5-bdb6-6861f4521205-20150930-story.html  (Quoting for-
mer U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for Global Criminal Justice, Stephen Rapp as arguing that 
“[t]he Russians are walking into a situation where they could be held criminally responsible 
. . . . If you aid the Syrian air force in committing war crimes such as dropping barrel 
bombs on civilians, you can find yourself held responsible right up to the top, including 
President Putin. . . . For aiding and abetting, you don’t have to intend for horrible things 
to happen, you just have to know they are happening.”). 
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In this hypothetical situation, information supporting an inference that 
officials of the assisting State were aware of both the substantial likelihood 
that assistance would facilitate war crimes and of the state of mind of Syri-
an military personnel could potentially include: 
 
 Statements by Syrian officials indicating an intent by the Syria 
to target civilian objects or specifically protected property; 
 Credible reports that the Syrian military generally does not ap-
propriately distinguish between civilian objects and military ob-
jectives in planning air strikes; 
 Credible reports indicating the Syrian personnel conducting, 
planning, or ordering air strikes generally do not understand the 
difference between civilian objects and military objectives; 
 Credible reports indicating that Syria has repeatedly intentional-
ly targeted civilian objects or specifically protected property; 
and 
 Credible reports indicating systematic deficiencies in Syrian air 
operations (e.g., use of patently unreliable intelligence49 or fail-
ure to match weapons to targets) that significantly increase the 
risk of unlawful airstrikes, and that Syrian commanders are 
aware of the deficiencies and have failed to adopt adequate 
remedies. 
 
Depending upon the nature of assistance to a partner (e.g., which com-
bat missions rely on that assistance), the argument for aiding and abetting 
liability would likely turn on what the officials of the assisting State were 
aware of when they provided assistance. The greater the awareness that the 
partner receiving assistance failed to comply with LOAC, that such viola-
tions reflected policy decisions or systematic deficiencies and that viola-
tions were likely to continue in the future, the stronger the argument that 
individual officials of the assisting State would be aiding and abetting war 
crimes.  
 
                                                                                                                      
49. See Markham & Schmitt, supra note 12, at 681 (“At its most basic level, an indis-
criminate attack is one where the weapon system could be aimed, but the attacker fails to 
do so, as in the case of blindly dropping bombs over enemy territory. Other examples 
include an attack based on patently unreliable information and one in which the weapon is 
employed in an environment that causes it to be highly inaccurate (e.g., at a very high alti-
tude or in weather that disrupts guidance system functionality”).). 
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IV. RISK MITIGATION 
 
The preceding section laid out a number of potential international legal is-
sues associated with working with a range of military partners, be they State 
militaries that are part of a formal coalition or non-State armed groups re-
ceiving various forms of military assistance. This section considers risk mit-
igation measures that an assisting State should consider in order to reduce 
its potential legal exposure. Specifically, it addresses mitigating two related 
types of risk: (1) that the assisted party will violate LOAC and (2) that the 
assisting party will be legally implicated in any such LOAC violations. 
The options discussed below are illustrative, not exhaustive. They vary 
both with respect to the degree of intrusion into a partner’s operations and 
the effort required by the assisting State to undertake them. The degree of 
mitigation necessary will depend on the perceived legal risk, itself a func-
tion of a partner’s underlying conduct and the quantity and quality of assis-
tance provided. What measures an assisting State should adopt may also 
depend, inter alia, on countervailing policy considerations and resource con-
straints. It is also worth emphasizing that an assisting State might undertake 
many of these measures for policy reasons regardless of its perception of 
the legal risk associated with assistance to a partner.  
 
A. Vetting and Due Diligence 
 
The first and most basic form of risk mitigation is ex ante screening of po-
tential partners, either with respect to individual fighters or leaders or rele-
vant military units. Such assessments may help to eliminate particularly 
problematic candidates for support or identify deficiencies in potential 
partners to be addressed through further measures discussed below.  
There are a range of potentially relevant factors to be considered in vet-
ting. Most obvious is assessing whether potential partners will engage in 
deliberate malfeasance that results in violations of LOAC. An assessment 
of deliberate LOAC violations could take into consideration policies or 
practices of the potential partner and credible reporting of past violations.50 
                                                                                                                      
50. For the purposes of complying with domestic statutory requirements, the U.S. 
Department of State conducts so-called “Leahy-vetting” of recipients of assistance (for 
purposes of the Foreign Assistance Act) to foreign security forces, as well as certain De-
partment of Defense training programs, to ensure that recipients have not committed 
“gross violations of human rights.” See Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, 22 
U.S.C. § 2378d (2012). Leahy-vetting would not necessarily be required for all forms of 
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More subtle is the issue of whether, notwithstanding any stated inten-
tion or policy of complying with LOAC, a potential partner correctly inter-
prets and applies LOAC in practice. With respect to targeting, a potential 
partner may misapply the law as to what persons and objects may be made 
the object of attack. For example, a potential partner may employ an overly 
inclusive functional standard as to who constitutes an enemy combatant 
which includes all military age males, all adherents of particular religion or 
all inhabitants of a particular region. A potential partner may also apply an 
overly broad interpretation of what objects constitute military objectives 
(e.g., all civilian bakeries in areas controlled by an opposing party). Unless 
an assisting State has an operational track record by which to judge a po-
tential partner, assessing the likelihood of LOAC violations resulting from 
a potential partner’s “mistake of law” may be difficult and time consuming 
and require embedding operational and legal experts with the group in or-
der to observe how their members apply LOAC in practice. 
 In addition to malice and gross misapplication of LOAC, there are a 
range of factors related to the institutional and technical capabilities of po-
tential partners that increase the risk of LOAC violations. Examples of in-
stitutional deficiencies that can increase the likelihood of LOAC violations 
include: 
 
 The inability of commanders to exercise effective command 
and control over their forces;  
 Poor collection and analysis of intelligence used in targeting; 
and 
 Poor coordination and information flow within or between el-
ements of the partner military, e.g., air and ground components. 
 
Finally, it would be prudent to assess whether the forces of a prospec-
tive partner possess the competence to use specific weapons in a lawful 
manner. The sophistication and destructive potential of the weapon or 
weapon system will likely bear on the level of skill required by its operator 
in order to use the weapon consistent with the principles of distinction and 
proportionality. If an assisting State is providing light arms to a partner, no 
special competence beyond marksmanship may be necessary in order to 
use the weapons in a lawful manner. In contrast, if an assisting State is con-
                                                                                                                      
assistance discussed in this article, given the narrower scope of “assistance” for Foreign 
Assistance Act purposes.  
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sidering whether to provide an anti-aircraft missile system to a partner 
force, it would be prudent for that State to assess beforehand whether the 
potential recipient has not only had the appropriate training, but also the 
necessary ancillary equipment to distinguish in practice between military 
aircraft and civilian airliners when using the missile system.  
Although shortcomings identified during vetting may not be show-
stoppers in terms of whether or not an assisting State provides aid to a po-
tential partner, such due diligence should inform whether to pursue addi-
tional risk mitigation measures. At a minimum, this research may enable an 
assisting State to identify components of a partner’s military force that are 
more prone to conduct operations consistent with LOAC and work with 
or direct assistance to those components. 
 
B. Training 
 
Having identified shortcomings in a military partner, one way to address 
them is through training. At the most basic level this can involve practical 
instruction on LOAC rules and the application of those rules to the types 
of scenarios a partner is likely to face in the conflict. Depending on the so-
phistication of the partner force, an assisting State may wish to stress over-
ly inclusive bright-line rules rather than instructing a partner on when spe-
cific objects normally protected under LOAC lose their protection, or how 
to weigh anticipated military advantage against expected harm to civilians 
for the purpose of complying with the principle of proportionality.  
Depending on the arms a partner will be using, weapons training may 
be far more important in promoting LOAC compliance than instruction in 
the rules and principles of LOAC itself. As a perquisite for LOAC compli-
ance a partner must be able to reliably (though not necessarily perfectly) 
direct its weapons at military objectives as opposed to civilian objects. For 
example, if a partner is conducting airstrikes in the conflict and does not 
know how as a practical matter to reliably distinguish between military ob-
jectives and civilian targets, extensive training would likely be necessary be-
fore an assisting State could reasonably expect its partner’s combat air op-
erations to comply with LOAC. 
 
C. Monitoring and Conditionality 
 
To further mitigate the risk that an assisting State will be legally implicated 
in a partner’s LOAC violations, assistance can be conditioned on compli-
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ance with LOAC. Depending upon the assisting State’s physical access to 
its partner’s operations, it may be possible to monitor compliance through 
the use of liaison officers or other means.  
 
1. Monitoring Targeting 
 
In general, it is often difficult to reach definitive conclusions in assessing 
whether specific attacks by third parties violated LOAC or constituted war 
crimes.51 In assessing the lawfulness of targeting decisions, much of the 
information needed to determine whether a specific target is a lawful mili-
tary objective or whether the expected harm to civilians is excessive in rela-
tion to the anticipated military advantage may be in the exclusive posses-
sion of the attacker. Even close coalition partners may not have sufficient 
information to thoroughly assess the lawfulness of each other’s targeting 
decisions. 
One option for addressing the difficulty of monitoring a partner’s com-
pliance with LOAC is for the assisting State to embed personnel with the 
partner’s forces in order to observe how the partner conducts targeting. 
Such monitoring may not only allow for a general assessment of the law-
fulness of a partner’s operations, but also an assessment of whether aid 
provided by the assisting State is facilitating LOAC violations. In addition, 
the presence of such personnel from the assisting State may serve to deter 
deliberate LOAC violations by the partner’s forces. 
A more intrusive form of risk mitigation that may be necessary if em-
bedded personnel of the assisting State lack adequate visibility on a part-
ner’s operations is to condition assistance on the partner’s strict adherence 
to a no-strike list (NSL) composed of entities that are generally not lawful 
targets. Using adherence to a NSL as a crude proxy for LOAC compliance 
overcomes some of the difficulties inherent in third-party targeting assess-
ments and reduces the inquiry to the simple question of whether or not a 
partner struck a listed facility. Such a list can be composed of some combi-
nation of specific objects (e.g., an individual temple at Palmyra) or catego-
ries of objects (e.g., mosques or hospitals). Such a list will likely be overly 
inclusive with respect to the protections afforded by LOAC (e.g., a hospital 
                                                                                                                      
51. See Carolin Wuerzner, Mission Impossible? Bringing Charges for the Crime of Attacking 
Civilians or Civilian Objects before International Criminal Tribunals, 90 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW 
OF THE RED CROSS 907 (2008); Laurie Blank, Geoffrey S. Corn & Eric Jensen, Surveying 
Proportionality: Whither the Reasonable Commander, JUST SECURITY (Mar. 25, 2015), https://w 
ww.justsecurity.org/21474/surveying-proportionality-reasonable-commander/. 
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could potentially be converted into a military objective if used as a military 
headquarters rather than a hospital). Nonetheless, if an assisting State does 
not have a high degree of confidence in the judgment or capacity its part-
ner to make reasonable targeting decisions52 (particularly at the lower levels 
within their military hierarchy), it may be better to ask them to adhere to 
bright-line rules rather than standards such as proportionality or to make 
nuanced assessments as to whether a facility is a military objective or a ci-
vilian object.  
Procedurally, an assisting State could require a partner to (1) only strike 
objects on the NSL after high-level approval within the partner’s chain of 
command, (2) only strike objects on the NSL after approval from the as-
sisting State (“dual-key approval”) or (3) never strike an object on the NSL 
under any circumstances, regardless of whether or not the partner assesses 
the object to be a lawful target. 
 
2. Monitoring Detention 
 
Regarding detention, if an assisting State has reason to believe that abuse is 
a systematic problem in its partner’s detention facilities, monitoring may be 
an appropriate tool to reduce both the likelihood of LOAC violations and 
the likelihood that its assistance will facilitate LOAC violations. For exam-
ple, it has been widely reported, including by Human Rights Watch53 and 
the UN Human Right Council’s Commission of Inquiry,54 that the abuse 
and torture of detainees is widespread in detention facilities operated by the 
Syrian government. Prior to transferring detainees to the custody of the 
Syrian government, an assisting State could seek credible and reliable assur-
ances not only with respect to the humane treatment of the detainees, but 
also that the treatment of the detainees would be monitored. Such moni-
toring could be conducted directly by an assisting State or indirectly by an 
independent third-party such as a humanitarian organization.   
   
                                                                                                                      
52. See supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text. 
53. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, IF THE DEAD COULD SPEAK: MASS DEATH AND TOR-
TURE IN SYRIA’S DETENTION FACILITIES (Dec. 16, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/report/ 
2015/12/16/if-dead-could-speak/mass-deaths-and-torture-syrias-detention-facilities. 
54. U.N. Human Rights Council, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Deaths in Detention in the Syri-
an Arab Republic U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/CRP.1 (Feb. 3, 2016), http://www.ohchr.org/D 
ocuments/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoISyria/A-HRC-31-CRP1_en.pdf. 
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3. “Owning” Targeting and Detention 
 
The most intrusive form of risk mitigation and potentially the least desira-
ble for a range of policy reasons is direct integration into a partner’s mili-
tary operations or the take over of these operations. It may be the case that 
in practice a partner is simply unable to comply with LOAC due to institu-
tional shortcomings and that no amount of training, exhortation or condi-
tioning of assistance will remedy their deficiencies in any reasonable 
timeframe. For example, a partner might lack the technical competence to 
operate certain weapons systems in a manner that allows them to comply 
with the principle of distinction in urban warfare. Perhaps discipline among 
partner forces is so poor that detainees they hold will invariably be abused, 
if not summarily executed. Or, perhaps a partner simply lacks detention 
facilities and will not practice “catch-and-release” with respect to detainees. 
In such circumstances, an assisting State may be left with few attractive 
options. There may be a tension between becoming more involved in a 
partner’s operations and approaching the line of control  for State respon-
sibility for a non-State actor and maintaining an arms-length relationship 
that might still implicate the officials of the assisting State as aiders and 
abettors for war crimes committed by the partner.55 Assuming the assisting 
State feels compelled to assist or work with the deficient partner for opera-
tional, strategic or diplomatic reasons; the best solution for addressing its 
partner’s LOAC violations may be to become more involved in the viola-
tor’s operations, not less.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
The fact that States seek to advance their foreign policy objectives through 
indirect military means such as working with partners in lieu of, or in order 
to supplement, their own direct military efforts is not in and of itself a new 
phenomenon. However, the interplay between partnered operations and 
LOAC compliance has been thrown into high relief due to the extensive 
foreign involvement in the Syrian conflict and the atrocities that character-
ize the war. 
Beyond Syria, partnered operations have taken on a new prominence 
due the nature of to the United States broader counter-ISIL campaign. As 
President Obama has made clear, the effort to eradicate ISIL “will be dif-
                                                                                                                      
55. See supra Section III.B.  
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ferent from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.”56 Instead, the U.S. campaign 
against ISIL will be waged in large part through U.S. support to “partner 
forces on the ground.”57 
The significance of such partnered operations has also changed because 
of the shifting legal environment in which assisting States provide aid to 
their partners. International law is increasingly imposing additional re-
strictions, obligations or liability on States and individual officials related to 
the assistance they render to those fighting on distant battlefields.  
The disparities between assisting States and partners magnify the ef-
fects of these evolving legal regimes. In any relationship between an assist-
ing State and a partner, an assisting State runs the risk of “mirror imaging”; 
assuming that its partner’s interests, values and capabilities are the same as 
its own. Although there will never be perfect alignment, even between the 
closest allies, the divergence between partners in many contemporary con-
flicts may be so great as to raise serious legal issues for an assisting State. 
An assisting State cannot merely rely upon a partner’s pious recitations of 
humanitarian platitudes. Despite normative claims to the contrary, the hu-
manitarian values embodied in LOAC are by no means universal. Nor can 
an assisting State assume that the armed group with which it is working will 
display the same degree of competence as a major NATO ally. A partner’s 
commitment to and ability to comply with LOAC cannot be assumed, it 
must instead be demonstrated.  
 
                                                                                                                      
56. President Barack Obama, Statement by the President on ISIL (Sept. 10, 2014), 
(transcript available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/10/State 
ment-president-isil-1). 
57. Id. See also Lisa O. Monaco, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and 
Counterterrorism, Remarks at the Council on Foreign Relations: Evolving to Meet the 
New Terrorist Threat (Mar. 7, 2016) (transcript available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
the-press-office/2016/03/07/remarks-lisa-o-monaco-council-foreign-relations-kenneth-m 
oskow-memorial) (“Destroying ISIL starts with going after ISIL abroad. And, as our sec-
ond pillar recognizes, we can’t do it alone. The United States has built a broad coalition of 
66 international partners. We’re sharing vital intelligence. We’re training, equipping, and 
empowering partners on the ground in Syria and Iraq.”). 
